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SUMMARy
Joseph Stalin is not yet dead, it would seem. The Soviet leader who was responsible 
for the deaths of millions over his thirty-year rule still commands worryingly high levels 
of admiration for a host of reasons. These findings are clear in the first-ever comparative 
opinion polls on the dictator in the post-Soviet countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
and Russia. The surveys, commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment in 2012, suggest de-
Stalinization has not succeeded in the former Soviet Union and most post-Soviet citizens 
have not come to grips with their history. 
Poll Findings
•	 In Russia, support for Stalin has actually increased since the end of the Soviet Union. 
•	 There is a correlation between Stalin’s rehabilitation in Russia and the presidency of 
Vladimir Putin.
•	 There is a growing level of indifference toward Stalin, especially among young people. 
This is especially apparent in Azerbaijan, where 39 percent of young respondents do not 
even know who Stalin is.
•	 Georgians display alarmingly high levels of admiration for Stalin—45 percent of them 
express a positive attitude toward the former Soviet leader. 
•	 The polls are symptomatic of a case of “doublethink.” Respondents say that Stalin was 
both a “cruel tyrant” and a “wise leader.” 
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Analyzing the Results
Post-Soviet citizens are confused. The poll results are more an illustration of feelings of 
dependency and confusion than genuine support for a dictatorial government. Russians in 
particular lack alternative historical models. 
Stalin is still identified strongly with victory in World War II. The memory of the 
defeat of Nazi Germany remains very strong in all four countries polled, especially among 
older citizens. Stalin is still admired as a wartime leader—even as the same people reject 
his acts of repression.  
De-Stalinization in Russia has been half-hearted. There have been two-and-a-half at-
tempts to engage the public in a debate on Stalin’s crimes, but only one of them, begun 
under Mikhail Gorbachev, had some success. Putin’s Kremlin has found the image of 
Stalin useful in his effort to solidify his authority.
A new generation thinks differently. Many Russian urbanites are de-Sovietized, more 
self-sufficient, and more critical of Russian history. Stalin is losing his power to attract or 
repel this segment of society.
De-Stalinization in Georgia has not run deep. The anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin cam-
paigns launched by the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili were conspicuous 
but superficial, and underlying opinions of the leader remain favorable. However, for 
Georgians, Stalin is much more a national icon than a political model.
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Sixty years after his death in March 1953 and more than twenty years after the end of 
the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin has not been properly consigned to history. 
He remains in a prominent tomb in Red Square in the heart of Moscow, his image is on 
sale in flea markets in Russia and Georgia, his portrait is carried in political rallies. In 2012 
Stalin held first place in a poll of great figures in Russian history. In 2013 buses carried his 
image as Russians marked the seventieth anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad in the city of 
Volgograd, which had been renamed Stalingrad for the day.
It is natural to be alarmed about this—and over the last few years many panic-inducing 
headlines have warned about “Stalin worship” in the former Soviet Union.1 After all, this is 
a man the world regards as being one of the three chief monsters of the twentieth century, 
alongside Hitler and Mao, having been responsible for the deaths of millions of people 
between the early 1920s and 1953. 
Yet the enduring admiration for Stalin is first of all a puzzle that needs decoding. Certainly, 
no one wants to restore the gulag, and even the authoritarian post-Soviet states are still a 
long way from being Stalinist.2 What exactly lies behind the positive expressions of support 
for Stalin? Who and where are the admirers and what motivates them? 
The Stalin question is not just important as part of the debate about the uses of history. It 
goes to the heart of contemporary questions about politics, the relationship between society 
and state, democratization, and education in the former Soviet Union.  
INTRODUCTION
thomas de waal
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To shed light on these issues, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace commis-
sioned two respected polling organizations, the Levada Center in Moscow and the Cau-
casus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi, to ask citizens 
in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia eight questions about their attitudes toward 
Stalin. The surveys were conducted in October and November 2012.
This was the first time a full comparative cross-country survey of this kind had been 
undertaken. The Levada Center was able to compare its results with a number of previous 
polls in Russia on Stalin, but no such poll had ever been conducted in the three South 
Caucasus countries since they gained independence in 1991–1992. 
The variance in survey answers is a reminder that among his former subjects, there is not 
just one Stalin but many—Russia’s Stalin is (very) different from Georgia’s, for instance. 
In a famous essay, the historian Alfred Rieber called Stalin the “Man of the Borderlands,” 
who built for himself a triple mythical identity as a non-national proletarian, a Georgian, 
and a Russian.3 Stalin’s success in projecting those three different identities at once ex-
plains why he is still venerated by categories of people who have little in common with 
each other (die-hard Communists, Georgian nationalists, Russian statists).  
Some of the results are shocking. Perhaps the most worrying figures come from Stalin’s 
homeland, Georgia. An extraordinary 45 percent of Georgians have positive attitudes 
toward the dictator, and 68 percent call him a “wise leader.” Meanwhile, 38 percent of Ar-
menians (the highest number in the four countries polled) agree with the statement, “Our 
people will always have need of a leader like Stalin, who will come and restore order.” In 
Azerbaijan, whose population—to its credit—showed the greatest antipathy toward Stalin, 
perhaps the most striking finding was that 22 percent of the population (and 39 percent 
of young people) do not even know who Stalin is.
There are many contradictions that give important nuance to the picture. For example, 
even those who say they admire Stalin also admit that they do not approve of his brutal-
ity. And the number of people who say there is “no justification” for Stalin’s crimes is fairly 
high, ranging from 45 to 57 percent across the four countries. 
Not surprisingly, the poll also shows massive endorsement, especially among pensioners, 
for Stalin as the victor of the Great Patriotic War over Hitler. Interestingly, the support is 
even stronger in the Caucasus than in the country that bore the brunt of the conflict, Rus-
sia. This is a reminder of how even in the West (just take a look at the pictures of Stalin 
sitting with Churchill and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in 1945) Stalin’s brutal image 
is complemented by his role as the wartime leader who defeated Hitler. 
Clearly, these figures deserve careful reading. In this volume, three respected scholars in 
Russia and Georgia reflect on them. 
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Levada Center director Lev Gudkov’s comparison of survey results in Russia since the 
perestroika period, culminating in the Carnegie poll, shows definitively that support for 
Stalin has strengthened rather than weakened since the end of the USSR. This of course 
has many explanations; at the least it suggests that many Russians continue to have strong 
feelings of dependency on and loyalty toward an autocratic ruler. Gudkov explains that 
in Russia, Stalin is a cipher for the perceived failings of democracy, and that the current 
president, Vladimir Putin, has deliberately manipulated the dictator’s image to reinforce 
his effort to build a “power vertical” in Russia. 
Lasha Bakradze, the director of the Georgian State Museum of Literature, makes a power-
ful case that those Georgians who admire Stalin do so in a quasi-religious way that does 
not necessarily overlap with their political convictions. After all, when responding to a 
question in the October 2012 CRRC poll, a high number of Georgians also approved of 
democracy. (To add to the contradictions, polls show that consistently the most popular 
figure in Georgia is the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, the head of an ancient institu-
tion that has battled both Communism and Westernization.) 
Around half of our respondents told the pollsters that they regard Stalin as a “wise leader.” 
And the authors address the question of why de-Stalinization has not worked in the post-
Soviet Union. 
Maria Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center writes of “two-and-a-half” de-Stalinization 
campaigns in Russia, all incomplete, that have not penetrated society deeply enough. 
Lasha Bakradze analyzes how the proudly pro-Western government of President Mikheil 
Saakashvili in Georgia dismantled Stalin statues but failed to engage the public in a debate 
about why it was doing so—or indeed failed to put up a memorial to Stalin’s victims. Just 
as in 1961, when Nikita Khrushchev withdrew Stalin’s body from Lenin’s Mausoleum in 
Red Square at night by stealth, so too the Georgian government in 2010 pulled down the 
massive statue of Stalin in his hometown of Gori without warning or consultation. In both 
Moscow and Gori, the body and the statue were moved only a few meters away. 
Carnegie’s survey confirms that unfortunately in the post-Soviet space, Stalin is still a 
figure of the present, not the past. The hope is that this publication will help stimulate a 
new debate on the failures to de-Stalinize the minds of post-Soviet citizens and bury him 
once and for all. 
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NOTES
1	 See	for	example	Adrian	Blomfield,	“Why	Russia	Wants	to	Make	Stalin	a	Saint,”	Daily Telegraph,	July	
24,	2008,	www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3560932/Why-Russia-wants-to-make-
Stalin-a-saint.html;	Dmitry	Solovyov,	“Liberals	rap	Kremlin	as	Stalin	is	worshipped,”	Reuters,	March	
5,	2010,	www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/05/us-russia-stalin-idUSTRE6241M820100305.
2	 Arguably,	Turkmenistan	is	an	exception,	although	the	country’s	many	political	prisoners	are	more	
likely	to	be	imprisoned	than	executed.
3	 Alfred	Rieber,	“Stalin,	Man	of 	the	Borderlands,”	American Historical Review,	vol.	106,	no	5,	December	
2001,	1651–91.
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by THE NUMbERS
FIGURE 1
Which of these words best describes your attitude to Stalin? (percent)
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FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
Would you like to live in a country ruled by a person like Stalin? 
(percent)
“Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might 
and prosperity.” (percent)
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FIGURE 4
FIGURE 5
“Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of 
millions of innocent people.” (percent)
“For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing  
is that under his leadership the Soviet people won the Great 
Patriotic War.” (percent)
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FIGURE 6
FIGURE 7
Which of the following opinions about Stalin’s acts of repression do 
you most agree with? (percent)
“Our people will always have need of a leader like Stalin, who will 
come and restore order.” (percent)
FIGURE 8
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FIGURE 8
In your opinion, can the sacrifices which the Soviet people endured 
under Stalin be justified by the results achieved in a short period? 
(percent)

Stalin, Dictator—and Also Victor in 
World War II 
With Winston Churchill and Franklin 
D. Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in 
February 1945
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A Legacy That Holds Back Russia
maria lipman
On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin died of a stroke at his dacha on the outskirts of Mos-
cow. In 1959, Russian poet Boris Chichibabin wrote a poem called “Stalin Is Not Dead.” 
It’s early still to celebrate—Let some other oracle shout out
That our old wounds will hurt no more . . . 
That the dead foe’s body won’t be our banner . . . 
Let him shout, but I know well—Stalin is not dead. 
Echoing Chichibabin’s poem, American historian Martin Malia wrote over three decades later: 
Although [Stalin] no longer lived physically, he still lived, and would continue to live.... 
The remaining four decades of Soviet history would be dominated by one overriding problem: 
How to bury Stalin. All three of his principal successors as General Secretary—Khrushchev, 
Brezhnev, and Gorbachev—were primarily concerned with the problems engendered by  
his legacy.1
When his book was published, Malia 
believed that Stalin “lived . . . until the 
end of the system in 1991.” But even 
today, sixty years after Stalin’s death and 
over twenty years after “the end of the 
system,” the Russian people still have 
STALIN IS NOT DEAD
The Russian people still have  
not come to terms with  
Stalin’s legacy.
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not come to terms with Stalin’s legacy. The 2012 Levada Center poll conducted in Russia 
and commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for this publica-
tion is a graphic illustration of conflicting opinions about the dictator. 
One might assume that the most common perception of Stalin is that of a cruel, in-
humane tyrant guilty of exterminating millions of innocent people. The survey results, 
however, show a much more complex picture. 
Consider the following: Almost half of Russians surveyed believe “Stalin was a wise leader 
who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.” But over half of the Russians 
surveyed believe that Stalin’s acts of repression constituted “a political crime that cannot 
be justified.” And about two-thirds agree that “for all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the 
most important thing is that under his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patri-
otic War” (the name Russians give to World War II). 
The embalmed body of Lenin, Stalin’s Bolshevik predecessor, is still on display in the mau-
soleum in Red Square. Lenin’s name and monuments adorn every Russian city. Yet Lenin 
is slowly slipping into oblivion, and Russians now name Stalin as the public figure that 
has had the most influence on world 
history (see table 1 in Lev Gudkov’s 
chapter in this volume). 
But there is something curious about 
this recognition: traveling around Rus-
sia, one would never guess the Russian 
people believe Stalin is their greatest 
compatriot. Stalin statues or portraits 
are nowhere to be found, and there are 
no streets or cities named after him.2 
Stalin is a hidden hero, and this status is part of the inherently vague nature of Russia’s 
post-Communist statehood and national identity. The public perception of Stalin is am-
biguous, and the official discourse is ambivalent and evasive. Though his images are absent 
from the Russian physical space, his presence can be easily felt in the Russian political 
order and in state-society relations. 
Two and a Half de-STalinizaTion CampaignS
Stalin’s death was accompanied by an outpouring of public grief. In a last act of mass 
murder on March 9, 1953, the deceased tyrant caused hundreds of deaths as hysterical 
mourners were crushed and trampled in the gigantic crowds trying to take a last look at 
Stalin’s body. 
Stalin is a hidden hero, and this 
status is part of the inherently 
vague nature of Russia’s post-
Communist statehood and 
national identity. 
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Yet, that same year the process of release and (often posthumous) rehabilitation of gu-
lag prisoners convicted of treason and other political crimes began. Meanwhile, Stalin 
worship appeared to continue as usual. The tyrant was placed in the mausoleum in Red 
Square, his body alongside Lenin’s, embalmed and preserved for eternity. 
Behind the scenes, a fierce power struggle raged. Eventually, Nikita Khrushchev emerged 
as the leader of the post-Stalin Soviet Union, and in 1956 he launched a campaign to 
expose Stalin’s personality cult, accusing him of mass repressions of innocent people. 
Khrushchev had physical symbols of Stalin torn down and erased. Countless cities, streets, 
factories, and collective farms that bore Stalin’s name were renamed. Stalin’s body was 
quietly removed from the mausoleum, but it still remained in Red Square—right next to 
where Lenin rests. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization only went so far.
The dethroning of Stalin, however, was enough to generate controversy and turmoil in 
Soviet society. Some people were angry at what they saw as insufficient exposure and con-
demnation of Stalin’s crimes, while others were outraged by the vilification of the leader 
they worshipped as a god. In Georgia in 1956, this outrage led to mass pro-Stalin rallies 
that lasted for several days and were eventually brutally suppressed (see Lasha Bakradze’s 
essay in this volume).3
Some among the Soviet leadership watched Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization process with 
alarm. The condemnation of the supreme leader encouraged public debate and therefore 
undermined the legitimacy of a regime built on the concept of the absolute infallibility of 
the Communist state. 
In 1964, Khrushchev was deposed in a bloodless coup d’état. The post-Khrushchev 
Soviet leadership quickly wrapped up his anti-Stalin campaign. During the “creeping re-
Stalinization” that followed, the condemnation of Stalin stopped, but he was not publicly 
exonerated. His name was practically absent from official discourse. The precious few pub-
lic contributions to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization of Soviet life, whether in art, literature, 
or social thought, were shut down or driven underground. Chichibabin’s lines proved to 
be prophetic. 
A new wave of de-Stalinization was launched two decades later in Gorbachev’s perestroika 
era, a key element of which was what observers referred to as the “return of history.” In the 
late 1980s, a stream of media publications, books, and public events exposed Communist 
lies and distortions. In contrast to Khrushchev’s disclosures of Stalin’s crimes, this round 
of de-Stalinization engaged broad public constituencies. The momentum of the effort was 
so great that it radically delegitimized the Communist regime. By the end of 1991, the 
meltdown of Soviet Communism was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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Boris Yeltsin, the first president of post-Soviet Russia, had evolved into a passionate anti-
Communist. Yeltsin’s Russia rejected the Soviet system and adopted—at least on paper—a 
Western model of governance with democratic institutions. The condemnation of Stalinism 
and the tyrannical Communist regime appeared final.
But the enthusiasm to dismantle the Communist legacy, and Stalinism in particular, did 
not last long. It was soon overshadowed by the hardship and turmoil of the early post-
Communist reality, including the fierce political standoff that developed between Yeltsin’s 
government and the Communist opposition in the Russian legislature. The Commu-
nists evoked the Stalin era as a time of Russian glory. The comparison of Stalin’s Soviet 
Union—a nation that had conquered Hitler and become a superpower that kept half of 
the world under control—with dramatically weakened modern Russia was, in the eyes of 
the Russian Communists and their numerous supporters, definitive proof of the national 
treason committed by both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. 
Facing declining support, a tough Communist opposition, and many other challenges, 
Yeltsin did not follow through with de-Stalinization at a state level. Stalin’s grave remained 
in Red Square (and Lenin’s body stayed in the mausoleum), and no national memorial to 
the victims of the gulag was created. The one attempt made to secure a legal condemna-
tion of Soviet Communism was ineffective; the 1992 trial of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union failed to reach a verdict on the crimes committed by the Soviet regime. 
puTin’S poliTiCal order and THe riSe of STalin aS a 
poliTiCal Symbol
When Vladimir Putin emerged as Yeltsin’s successor in 2000, his chief goal was to recon-
solidate the Russian state. He put an end to the political turmoil in part by compromising 
with the Communists. By doing so, he was able to soften the political divisions in Russian 
society and move to recentralize political control. 
The regime that Putin built drew on the Soviet version of Russia’s traditional state model: 
centralized and uncontested state power with the domestic security forces as its main 
instrument of control. Implicit in this political order is the principle that the people remain 
powerless vis-à-vis the omnipotent state. 
The return of an essentially Soviet 
political arrangement once again con-
firmed Chichibabin’s prophecy, remind-
ing Russians that Stalin was not dead. 
Stalin’s symbolic return stemmed from 
the implicitly Soviet, paternalistic quali-
Stalin’s symbolic return 
stemmed from the implicitly 
Soviet, paternalistic quality of 
Putin’s regime.
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ty of Putin’s regime. But unlike Russian Communists, Putin’s government did not explic-
itly glorify Stalin as a founding father. Instead, Putin and his political allies were mostly 
evasive on the issue of Stalin. They rarely mentioned him, and if they did, such mentions 
tended to be negative rather than positive. 
In October 2007, during his second presidential term, Putin visited Butovo, the site of 
mass executions at the height of Stalin’s terror in 1937–1938. Putin was visibly shaken. 
“Insanity,” he said. “It is incredible. Why [were they killed]? . . . Those who were executed, 
sent to camps, shot and tortured number in the thousands and millions of people. . . .  
We need to do a great deal to ensure that this [tragedy] is never forgotten.”4 
The last two years of the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, who succeeded Putin in 2008, 
were notable for something of a third wave of de-Stalinization. In late 2009, Medvedev 
posted a passionate video blog on the Kremlin’s website in which he condemned “Stalin’s 
crimes.”5 In a 2010 newspaper interview, he said that Stalin “committed many crimes 
against his people.”6 
In early 2010, Putin, then serving as prime minister, commemorated the anniversary of 
the 1940 mass executions of Polish officers by Soviet state security forces at Katyn. Putin 
knelt jointly with his Polish counterpart, Donald Tusk, at the site of the killings and spoke 
of “repressions that smashed people regardless of their nationality, their beliefs or their 
faith.”7 At the same time, the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, passed 
a resolution that declared “the Katyn crime was carried out on direct orders of Stalin and 
other Soviet officials.”8 
Such explicit statements were fairly rare, and Medvedev’s de-Stalinization basically wound 
down as soon as his presidency ended and Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012. The am-
bitious program of de-Stalinization announced by Medvedev’s Council on Human Rights 
and Civil Society in 2010 was abandoned.9 But even before that, the anti-Stalin rhetoric of 
Putin and Medvedev was counterbalanced by their own statements and actions. 
Less than two months after his emotional visit to Butovo, Putin celebrated the nineti-
eth anniversary of the domestic security forces. The hero of the anniversary was the FSB 
(Federal Security Service), the successor to Soviet secret police agencies such as the KGB 
(Committee for State Security) and the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Af-
fairs). Those secret police agencies perpetrated mass killings, including the Butovo execu-
tions and the Katyn massacre. At the festivities he hosted in the Kremlin, Putin naturally 
did not mention what he had called a “tragedy” that should never be forgotten. Nor did 
he reference the later decades when the KGB persecuted dissidents and locked them up in 
labor camps and psychiatric asylums—those same years in which Putin was a KGB officer 
himself. He said, “Our goal today is to remember the heroic pages in the history of our 
special services.”10 
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Medvedev, widely seen as a more modern and liberal figure, addressed the FSB no less 
warmly.11 In a formal message, he expressed his firm belief that the current generation of 
FSB officers would “carry on the traditions of its predecessors with dignity”12—those same 
predecessors who were responsible for the mass repressions referred to in Medvedev’s own 
video blog “as one of the greatest tragedies in the Russian history.” 
The FSB itself has never rejected its Soviet legacy. The security agency is located in the 
Lubyanka—Stalin’s victims were tortured and shot in the building’s infamous basements. 
And in the Russian informal system of patronage, the agency’s political clout is unparal-
leled. Throughout his leadership, Putin has drawn on the FSB for many of his high-level 
government appointments. Dozens of FSB officers and generals have risen to top-ranking 
positions in the government and to control lucrative businesses. A recent book about the 
FSB refers to its members as “a new 
nobility” and claims the organization is 
more powerful and intimidating even 
than its immediate predecessor, the 
KGB. The FSB is not accountable to 
anyone, not even the Kremlin.13 
Even as Russia’s leaders occasion-
ally condemn Stalin and his crimes, 
they make sure the official rhetoric of 
condemnation does not go too far. A 
modicum of mourning for the victims 
of Stalin’s crimes may be acceptable, 
but it is better not to raise the ques-
tion of who the actual perpetrators were. It is to be expected that a regime based on the 
unquestioned power of the state and a prominent role for the state security services would 
avoid discussing what part these fundamental principles played in exposing Russia to a 
reign of bloody terror. 
There is no consistent official narrative of the Soviet past in general or Stalinism in 
particular. And there is still no national memorial to the victims of Stalin’s rule—Putin’s 
government has firmly rejected initiatives to create such a center of commemoration. 
THe ConTroverSial publiC perCepTion of STalin
Although Putin’s government has marginalized the anti-Stalinist discourse, it has not 
banned or suppressed it. Unlike the Soviet regime, the current government does not seek 
to impose an orthodox way of thinking on the people. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag 
Archipelago and other literature about Stalin’s terror is easily available in bookstores and 
 It is to be expected that a regime 
based on the unquestioned power 
of the state and a prominent role 
for the state security services 
would avoid discussing what part 
these fundamental principles 
played in exposing Russia to a 
reign of bloody terror. 
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libraries. And after consultation with Solzhenitsyn’s widow, Putin personally approved 
an abridged version of Solzhenitsyn’s epic for use in Russian secondary schools. Despite 
repeated proposals by a range of officials and loyalists that Russian schools should be as-
signed a single politically approved twentieth-century-history textbook,14 teachers can still 
choose which textbooks to use in class. 
Academic research of the history of Stalinism is mostly unrestricted (except that access to 
archival materials has been increasingly limited over the past few years). The environment 
has become inauspicious for the likes of Memorial, a well-known nongovernmental orga-
nization that conducts archival research documenting Stalin’s crimes. But the organization 
and its numerous local branches have been able to continue their commemorative work.
There may not be a national memorial to the victims of the gulag, but a large number of 
local ones, varying in style and scale, have been built during the post-Communist pe-
riod.15 Nongovernmental media outlets have published and broadcast a great quantity of 
material about Stalinism. Even state television has occasionally produced films and docu-
mentaries that chronicle the horrors of the Soviet gulag. 
At the same time, literature defending and glorifying Stalin is displayed side by side with 
the historical research of Russian and Western scholars. This literature is produced by 
several publishers, two of them affiliated with Russia’s largest publishing house, Eksmo. 
They publish popular nonfiction described by a scholarly researcher as “pseudo-history 
written from Stalinist positions.” There 
are estimated to be at least 100 such 
books in wide circulation. Titles such 
as The Forbidden Truth About Stalin’s 
Repressions, USSR Without Stalin: The 
Path to Catastrophe, and On the Way to 
1937: Stalin Against the Red Oligarchs 
are apparently in high demand. As the scholar points out, they are invariably displayed 
with their covers facing outward on the shelves in bookstores while works by academic 
historians are placed on the shelves with only their spines showing.16 
This juxtaposition reflects the public perception of Stalin as both a tyrant to blame for the 
deaths of millions and a wise and powerful leader who won the war against Hitler. In the 
minds of many Russians, in fact, the two perceptions are commonly combined. In the col-
lective post-Soviet psyche, national greatness is inseparable from violence and brutal force. 
One aspect of this self-perception is Russians’ belief that they belong to a great and vic-
torious nation. This view is centered around the Soviet Union’s 1945 victory in the Great 
Patriotic War, one of very few instances of consensual memory for Russians and an undis-
puted matter of national pride. Putin’s government has drawn heavily on the centrality of 
In the collective post-Soviet psyche, 
national greatness is inseparable 
from violence and brutal force.
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this war and victory in the minds of Russians and has stepped up the victory celebrations 
on May 9, which seem to grow ever larger as the war itself moves deeper into history. 
The overwhelming significance of the war and of Stalin as the commander in chief who 
led the nation to victory is one piece of the Stalin puzzle, one explanation why unambigu-
ous condemnation of him is impos-
sible in Russia. In Putin’s Russia, Stalin 
remains the embodiment of the state 
at its most powerful. 
With Russia no longer a superpower, 
Stalin also comes in handy as “com-
pensation” for a nation suffering from 
Russia’s loss of status in the world at large. His image as the conqueror of Nazi Germany 
and the leader of the Soviet superpower that was on par with the United States during 
the Cold War in a sense helps Russia make up for the humiliation it went through in the 
period following the collapse of the Communist empire. 
The perception of Stalin that has to do with the people’s victimhood and helplessness vis-
à-vis arbitrary and brutal rulers is less direct. The Russian historical experience has taught 
the Russian people that they are powerless against the omnipotent state and that their best 
strategy is to adapt to the will and whims of their rulers. This experience has generated a 
mentality of dependency and of accepting state paternalism as a fact of life. 
Today’s paternalism, however, is no longer Stalinist, no longer that of a sadistic father who 
keeps his children in constant fear of undeserved and cruel punishment. The Carnegie poll 
clearly indicates that the vast majority of Russians would not want to live under Stalin. The 
paternalism they remember with nostalgia—a nostalgia Putin draws upon—is that of the 
1970s, when the Soviet regime was milder, when people no longer lived in fear, and when 
the state guaranteed a reasonable level of security and delivered somewhat improved living 
standards. Putin’s modern paternalism may deliver even better incomes, but that comes 
with shocking inequality, egregious cronyism, corruption, the impunity of state servants, 
and, more recently, a growing sense of uncertainty and insecurity—all of which makes the 
nostalgia for the 1970s even stronger. 
Stalin’s ranking as the greatest Russian may be seen as an indirect reflection of this mental-
ity of dependency. Most Russians still choose inaction and loyalty to the state despite the 
injustice, corruption, and egregious abuse of authority by so-called servants of the state. 
About 80 percent respond in polls that they have no “influence on political life in Russia.”17 
Reliance on the state, however, is based on shunning responsibility and a fear of change, 
not on trust or genuine support. As long as the rulers deliver, a common sentiment goes, let 
them engage in their self-seeking practices—protesting or demanding better government is 
 In Putin’s Russia, Stalin remains 
the embodiment of the state at its 
most powerful. 
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pointless, since the people cannot make a difference anyway. And deep inside, there is an 
almost-unconscious belief that at a time of terrible crisis, such as a foreign invasion, that 
same state will lead its people to victory and greatness.
de-SovieTized: THe riSe of a new ruSSian menTaliTy
In late 2011, tens of thousands of Muscovites took to the streets to protest rigged parlia-
mentary elections. Their message, as it soon became clear, was barely political. Instead, 
it conveyed a moral, even emotional resentment of the model of state rule that Putin 
had established. Those who joined the mass rallies of 2011–2012 let it be known that 
they wanted to make a difference—or, as they would put it, they no longer wanted to be 
treated as cattle. 
One way to describe the protesters is as essentially un-Soviet or de-Sovietized Russians 
who had shed the mentality of dependency. Most of the protesters are products of the 
new, postindustrial economy that has developed chiefly in Moscow. They belong to the 
modern globalized world and have learned to assume responsibility for their choice of 
careers and lifestyles. They have an achiever’s mentality, something the traditional Russian 
experience could not have taught them. 
These people do not revere symbols of past Soviet greatness, Stalin or otherwise, because 
they do not need to compensate for any weaknesses of their own. As individuals they do 
not feel weak. They are part of the modern world, and they want their country to look 
forward and modernize rather than live with its back to the future, which Putin’s model of 
government entails. 
Those who took to the streets may be a tiny minority. But they also seem to represent a 
constituency of nonpaternalistic Russians that is growing as more and more young people 
from the provinces move to Moscow and other large urban centers in search of better job 
opportunities and modernized lifestyles. 
The perception of Stalin is a significant indicator of the rise of this new constituency, 
which becomes more visible when the poll results are closely analyzed and the differences 
related to age, urban/rural divide, education, and other factors become apparent. 
An indication of this trend over the past few years is a growing indifference to Stalin, espe-
cially among younger Russians. The results of the Carnegie poll provide further evidence 
for this development: eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds are almost twice as likely not to 
care about Stalin one way or another as members of the fifty-five-and-older age group. 
To the young, Stalin is increasingly losing his symbolic significance and becoming just 
a figure from a remote past. Younger Russians—the better-educated Moscow residents 
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and those who use the Internet to get news and other political information more often 
than older Russians—do not agree that “our people will always have need of a leader like 
Stalin, who will come and restore order.”
Russian society is becoming more diverse, and people’s perception of the state is a major 
line of division. The paternalistic model that Putin has established derives its legitimacy 
from a system of symbols that could be called “Stalinist”: an infallible state, patriotism 
understood as loyalty to the ruling authorities, disloyalty regarded as a criminal act. But 
these symbols, arguably still shared by a conservative and inactive Russian majority, are 
increasingly incapable of bringing the nation together. 
The symbol of Stalin may be slowly fading away, but it is still alive—not least because the 
new, modernized minorities, potentially a vehicle for Russia’s forward development, have 
not yet come up with alternative figures or ideas. Chichibabin’s 1959 poem still strikes a 
relevant chord:
Is not Stalin’s spirit in us now, . . . 
That we do not seek out the truth,
So scared are we of novelty?. . .
I’ll take my stand against the past,
But what help is there when within us— 
Stalin is not dead?
The transition Russia is going through is even bigger than that from Soviet Communism 
to market capitalism. Russia is engaged in a slow and uneven struggle to break free of its 
historical political legacy of monopolized state power and the dominance of the state over 
the people. As a symbol, rather than a historical figure, Stalin remains a significant part of 
this struggle. 
A true de-Stalinization process will require no less than a reinvention of Russian nation-
hood—based on a rejection of the traditional concept of the state, an end to the political 
and historical immunity of state security forces, and an acceptance of the concept of “we, 
the people” united by a shared vision of the future of Russia. It is impossible to say wheth-
er and when Russia will rise to this challenge. But until that happens, Stalin will  
not be dead.
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Pride in Victory 
President Vladimir Putin has made Stalin’s victory in 
World War II and pride in the Soviet Union a core part 
of his new Russian state ideology. Here, Putin speaks to 
officers on Red Square on Victory Day, May 9, 2012, with 
his former defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov.
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Analyzing a Totalitarian Symbol
lev gudkov
The name of Joseph Stalin continues to resonate in the post-Soviet space. 
This is not what was expected when the Soviet Union broke apart. In 1989, only 12 
percent of Russians surveyed named Stalin as one of the “most prominent people or social 
and cultural figures who have had the most significant influence on world history.” Stalin 
held the eleventh position in a list containing more than 100 different historical figures.1 
And yet, twenty-three years later, in a poll conducted especially for the Carnegie Endow-
ment in 2012, 42 percent of respondents named Stalin the most influential, and he took 
first place for the first time (see table 1 below).  
The astonishing resurgence of Stalin’s popularity in Russia tells us that public attitudes 
toward him are driven not by a change in awareness about his historical role but by the 
political climate of the time. Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia of 2012 needs symbols of 
authority and national strength, howev-
er controversial they may be, to validate 
the newly authoritarian political order. 
Stalin, a despotic leader responsible for 
mass bloodshed but also still identified 
with wartime victory and national unity, 
fits this need for symbols that reinforce 
the current political ideology. Yet, the 
THE ARCHETyPE OF  
THE LEADER
Vladimir Putin’s Russia of 2012 
needs symbols of authority  
and national strength to validate 
the newly authoritarian  
political order.
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overall impact on the Russian public of this partial return of Stalin is a rising level of po-
litical “doublethink,” confusion, and apathy.
Table 1. Great Historical Figures According to Russians
1989 1991 1994 1999 2008 2012 Change  in rank
Lenin 72% 59% 46% 42% 34% 37% 1à2
Marx 35% 8% 6% 5% 3% 4% 3à33
Peter the 
Great 38% 51% 56% 45% 37% 37% 2à2
Pushkin 25% 32% 31% 42% 47% 29% 4à4
Stalin 12% 28% 28% 35% 36% 49% 11à1
Note: These percentages reflect the number of times Stalin was mentioned compared to the entire 
population polled.
STalin’S reHabiliTaTion
At the end of 1990, at the height of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, few in 
Russia would have believed that Stalin would be mentioned for anything other than mass 
terror, collectivization, famine, the military catastrophe of the early phase of World War 
II, the fight against “cosmopolitans,” or other terrible events. In early 1991, 70 percent 
of Russians surveyed believed that Stalin would be forgotten or would signify little by 
the year 2000. Just 10 percent of respondents thought that in ten years’ time the name of 
Stalin would still mean something for the “peoples of the USSR.” (The remainder of those 
surveyed did not have a definite opinion.)
Stalin underwent a gradual popular rehabilitation throughout the 1990s. But the criti-
cal change in public attitudes occurred when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 
and sought to reestablish authoritarian rule in Russia. Putin launched a comprehensive 
program to ideologically reeducate society, which culminated in 2004–2005 with the 
preparations for the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory 
over Germany in 1945. 
The rehabilitation of Stalin has proceeded cautiously and ambiguously. Putin’s spin doctors 
did not deny that Stalin’s regime had conducted mass arrests and executions but tried to 
minimize the importance of these events. They did so while emphasizing as far as possible 
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the merits of Stalin as a military commander and statesman who had modernized the coun-
try and turned it into one of the world’s two superpowers.
Stalin once again became a legitimate positive figure on television and in political discourse 
after 2002. The Russian government discussed introducing into schools a new officially 
sanctioned history textbook with an approving mention of Stalin, and politicians spoke of 
the need to fight against “the distortions of history” in teaching the next generation.
On Stalin’s birthday in 2004, Boris Gryzlov, then the formal leader of the governing 
United Russia party and the speaker of the lower house of the Russian parliament, the 
State Duma, laid flowers at Stalin’s tomb by the Kremlin Wall and called for a historical 
reappraisal of the Soviet dictator. Gryzlov declared that Stalin’s “excesses” should not be 
allowed to obscure the “extraordinary” personality of a man who, “as leader of the coun-
try, did a great deal for Victory in the Great Patriotic War.” At the same time, Alexander 
Kuvayev, then the leader of the newly created Russian Communist Party of the Future, 
called Stalin “the most successful state leader” and a “politician whom Russia needs today.” 
In line with this political shift, over the last twenty years, attitudes toward Stalin have 
changed from being sharply negative to judging his role in history to be “generally positive” 
(see table 2 below). In the first ten years of Putin’s rule, the number of people who respect-
ed Stalin fell, as did the number of people who harbored feelings of “repulsion, hatred, and 
fear” toward him. However, the most common emotion has become indifference.
Table 2. Russians Have Generally Positive views of Stalin
Question asked: How would you assess Stalin’s role in the history/life of  
our country?
Russia 1994** 2003 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011
Generally 
positive* 27 53 42 42 49 51 45
Generally 
negative* 47 33 37 37 33 30 35
Don’t know 19 14 21 21 18 19 20
* Amalgamated answers: “entirely positive” combined with “mostly positive” and “mostly 
negative” with “entirely negative.”
** The 1994 poll used a different scale; along with the variants shown, the poll also offered 
the additional prompt “insignificant role,” which was chosen by 5 percent of those polled.
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The impact of Putin’s policy, and of the effectiveness of the propaganda effort, can be 
seen in the results of a 2008 opinion poll. When asked, “Will people in Russia remember 
Stalin in fifty years’ time and if so, with what feelings (good, bad, or mixed)?” respondents 
gave complex answers. Twenty-three percent of Russians said that in the future Stalin 
would be completely forgotten. But a relative majority believed that he would be remem-
bered in the future, albeit “with mixed feelings.” 
A smaller number of those surveyed had more polarized and clearly defined views: 7 
percent of respondents expressed positive sentiments, 9 percent negative views, while 16 
percent had difficulty answering. The fact that only a small number of Russians hold a 
markedly negative and morally critical opinion of a dictator presents an exceedingly dif-
ficult problem for the sociological analysis of Russian society and shows us how big the 
challenge is of transforming it. 
The proportion of those expressing indifference rose from 12 percent in 2000 to 44 per-
cent in 2008. Among younger people—at whom the efforts of Putin’s political technolo-
gists and spin doctors was mostly directed—indifference was the overwhelming response; 
it was given by 59 percent of those surveyed. The Carnegie Endowment poll of 2012 
confirms the same spread of opinions (see table 3 below).
Table 3. Attitudes Toward Stalin in Detail
Question asked: What is your overall attitude toward Stalin? 
Postive Indifferent Negative I don’t know who Stalin is
Don’t know and 
refuse  
to answer
Overall 
Russia 28% 33% 23% 1% 16%
AGE GROUP
24–18 21% 41% 19% 3% 17%
39–25 20% 37% 26% 2% 15%
54–40 25% 33% 26% 1% 15%
55+ 41% 24% 19% 0% 16%
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EDUCATION
Higher 24% 34% 26% 1% 14%
Specialized 
secondary 27% 33% 23% 1% 15%
General 
secondary 28% 32% 21% 2% 18%
below 
secondary 34% 31% 19% 0% 16%
RESIDES IN
Moscow 18% 27% 46% 1% 18%
big city 26% 28% 24% 1% 20%
City 22% 36% 26% 3% 14%
Town 30% 39% 16% 1% 14%
village 35% 30% 18% 1% 16%
INTERNET USE
News and 
politics 21% 35% 31% 1% 13%
All 
purposes 21% 36% 26% 1% 16%
None 29% 8% 43% 4% 15%
OCCUPATION
Entrepreneur 16% 24% 27% 3% 30%
Manager 30% 40% 21% - 9%
Skilled 
worker 24% 29% 29% 2% 16%
Employee 20% 38% 23% 1% 18%
Worker 24% 38% 24% 0% 14%
Student 14% 44% 22% 5% 14%
Pensioner 47% 24% 16% 0% 14%
Housewife 25% 41% 22% 2% 10%
Unemployed 23% 26% 22% 2% 28%
Note: Some answers have been combined: positive includes expressions of “admiration,” “respect,” 
and “sympathy”; negative includes “hostility, irritation,” “fear,” and “disgust, hatred,” 2012 Carnegie 
poll; results presented as percentages of those polled.
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a regional view
Looking at the different social groups for whom the name of Stalin inspires respect today, 
small but important differences stand out. Smaller numbers of young people, educated 
people, or urban residents revere Stalin or subscribe to the “Stalinist myth” than do elderly 
or poorly educated Russians or those who live in villages or small towns (see tables 3 and 4).
The key point here is not so much that Russia’s poor, depressed, stagnating, and often 
declining provinces are a repository of Soviet-style thinking, but the reasons behind those 
attitudes. These areas lack social diver-
sity, most communication is basic and 
personal, and the price of human life 
is very low. A few institutions (mainly 
schools and television stations) com-
pensate for the lack of development by 
indoctrinating citizens with collective 
symbols and ideas. In big cities, by 
contrast, increasing individualism and 
more complex social interactions lead 
to a rejection of the myth of Stalin, not just indifference to it. (Table 4 below graphically 
demonstrates this divide in Russian society.)
Table 4. Opinions of Stalin as a Wise Leader or Cruel Tyrant  
in Detail
Question asked: To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: 1) “Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might 
and prosperity”? 2) “Stalin was a cruel and inhumane tyrant who is responsible 
for the extermination of millions of innocent people”? 
 
WISE 
LEADER
CRUEL 
TyRANT
Agree Disagree Don’t know Agree Disagree Difficult to answer
Overall 
Russia 50% 37% 14% 68% 19% 13%
In big cities, increasing 
individualism and more complex 
social interactions lead to a 
rejection of the myth of Stalin, 
not just indifference to it. 
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GENDER
Male 52% 35% 14% 65% 21% 14%
Female 48% 39% 13% 70% 17% 13%
AGE GROUP
24–18 38% 41% 21% 64% 16% 21%
39–25 44% 41% 14% 72% 16% 12%
54–40 48% 40% 11% 74% 16% 11%
55+ 61% 27% 11% 60% 27% 14%
EDUCATION
Higher 45% 43% 13% 71% 19% 11%
General 
secondary
46% 41% 14% 70% 16% 13%
Uncompleted 
secondary, 
primary
60% 28% 13% 63% 23% 15%
RESIDES IN
Moscow 46% 44% 9% 76% 14% 10%
big city 
(more than 
500,000 
people)
44% 44% 12% 71% 19% 10%
City 43% 41% 16% 65% 18% 17%
Town 
(under 
250,000)
52% 33% 15% 71% 15% 15%
village 59% 29% 12% 62% 26% 12%
HOUSEHOLD 
REvENUE
High 45% 43% 12% 74% 14% 11%
Mid-high 45% 40% 15% 69% 18% 14%
Mid-low 54% 35% 11% 65% 23% 12%
Low 59% 31% 11% 64% 24% 12%
Don’t know 49% 32% 19% 63% 18% 19%
Source: 2011 poll
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A similar breakdown of attitudes occurs in the other former Soviet republics polled for the 
Carnegie survey, with the exception of Georgia, which, as Stalin’s homeland, harbors very 
specific attitudes. (See Lasha Bakradze’s essay in this volume and figure 1 on page 7.)
The highest number of respondents in Carnegie’s survey who know nothing about Stalin 
was recorded in Azerbaijan, especially among young people. This may indicate the grow-
ing distance of Azerbaijanis from their Soviet ideological legacy as well as a culture and 
religion that is markedly different from the other countries surveyed.
In Russia as a whole, a high level of indifference to Stalin can be observed, with 50 
percent of respondents displaying a markedly neutral attitude toward him. In particular, 
respondents with significant social capital registered a distinct unwillingness to express 
firm or definite views on Stalin. 
Responses differ depending on geography as well. In Georgia, there were higher levels 
of indifference to Stalin in the capital cities than in villages. (There was no clear trend in 
Azerbaijan.) Meanwhile, in Moscow, 27 percent of those surveyed say they are indifferent 
to Stalin, and 30 percent of Russians residing in villages feel that way. In Russia’s small- 
and medium-sized towns, which form a kind of “reserve of socialism” and the social base 
of Putinism, the level of indifference ranged from 36 to 39 percent. 
Beyond indifference, in Moscow, 18 percent of those surveyed perceive Stalin positively 
and 46 percent negatively, while in small towns the figures are 29 percent and 16 percent 
and in villages the difference is even more striking—35 and 18 percent. 
Moving to the Caucasus, the same positive-negative divide is visible in the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani capitals, as in Moscow. However, in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, the picture 
is completely different, with 41 percent expressing positive views and 28 percent negative. 
More marginal social groups in Georgia (elderly people, inhabitants of villages, less edu-
cated respondents) are the main adherents to the Stalin myth, but there is a less marked 
discrepancy in attitudes between the social elite and the mass of the population than in 
other republics. 
unwilling To paSS JudgmenT
The good news underlying these findings is that the number of Russians with a posi-
tive opinion of Stalin’s merits is not in fact an indication of growing personal sympathy 
toward him or of a revival of totalitarian attitudes—even though it is quite tempting to 
interpret the findings that way. Russians have split  attitudes on Stalinism and Stalin’s 
era: Stalin’s “historical role” is given a higher rating in public opinion polls even as per-
ceptions of the era that bears his name retain their negative connotations (although not 
as strongly as previously).
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This ambiguity appears to be lacking in logic, but it is rooted in reality. Analysis of the 
data shows that the very same people say that “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant who 
is responsible for the extermination of millions of innocent people” and also that “Sta-
lin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.” The same 
people say that “Stalin’s policies . . . meant the country was unprepared for war” and also 
that “under his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War” (see table 4). 
The characteristic duality of attitudes observed in other countries (Stalin was both a “wise 
leader” and a “cruel, inhuman tyrant”) is also noticeable in Georgia.
A similar combination of not merely different but “incompatible” opinions recurs fre-
quently in sociological surveys. This is not just a sociological construction or a method-
ological mistake in the polls, nor is it “the schizophrenia of mass consciousness” many 
observers are inclined to discern. Rather, it is the product of the mechanism of “double-
think” that defines totalitarian—and to a lesser extent post-totalitarian—thinking. 
The ambivalence of mass thinking in Russia suggests that national authority and violence 
are inextricably linked and the combination of them helps form the characteristically 
traumatized collective identity of post-Soviet thinking. National authority cannot be 
expressed without violence. The Russian state has never represented public interests or the 
interests of society (in either czarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet times). It is thus unthinkable 
that it should carry out its public functions—enforcing military service, deemed to be a 
holy obligation and the duty of citizens, or controlling morals and culture—without an 
appropriate measure of force.    
The association of collective values such as unity, prestige, and fame with violence creates 
what could be called a “fascination with evil”—the attraction of ordinary citizens to state 
history, the majesty of empire, or the 
sanctification of despotic power. This 
may explain why Russians’ selection 
of “the greatest figures of all times and 
peoples” consists mainly of “great vil-
lains”—czars, leaders, and military com-
manders—supplemented by symbols of 
state culture (such as Alexander Push-
kin, Yury Gagarin, and Lev Tolstoy). 
The shocking appearance of Hitler on 
the list (in on average fifteenth place) is 
no longer such a surprise in this context.2
The strength of this collective belief helps explain the weakness of civic solidarity in 
Russia, which in turn decreases the likelihood of political change in the country. Private 
concerns are devalued for the sake of a great national project, over which the authorities 
have an exclusive monopoly.
The majority of Russians no 
longer accept the Stalinist model 
of a national ruler, but they lack 
the individual resources to oppose 
the state’s point of view. 
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In response to the polling question (posed in August 2009), “Who do you believe has 
primary responsibility for the persecutions and losses suffered by our country from the 
1930s to the early 1950s?” Nineteen percent of Russian respondents replied “Stalin” and 
the same number mentioned “the state system.” But a relative majority—41 percent—did 
not share this view, with 6 percent stating that “enemies of our country” were responsible 
or naming other similar reasons, while 15 percent had difficulty answering the question. 
While propaganda sympathetic to Stalin still has an obvious impact on the public, at the 
same time the Stalinist myth of an all-powerful dictator is eroding. The majority of Rus-
sians no longer accept the Stalinist model of a national ruler, but they lack the individual 
resources to oppose the state’s point of view. They hide from the painful fact that they are 
unprepared and incapable of delivering a moral judgment on the past. 
They therefore retreat into the comfortable position of “we do not yet know the whole 
truth about Stalin and his actions.” An absolute majority of Russians surveyed in 2008, 
68 percent, held that position and a further 19 percent who have difficulty answering the 
question can be put in the same category (see table 5 below). In other words, this stance is 
practically a universal public reaction to the trauma in the Russian national consciousness. 
Table 5. Russians and the Whole Truth About Stalin
Question asked: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
Russia 
Completely 
agree/Mostly 
agree
Mostly 
disagree/ 
Completely 
disagree 
Don’t know
1. Stalin was a wise leader who brought the 
Soviet Union to might and prosperity? 50% 37% 14%
2. Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant who is 
responsible for the extermination of millions of 
innocent people?
68% 15% 13%
3.For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, 
the most important thing is that under his 
leadership the Soviet people won the Great 
Patriotic War?
68% 16% 13%
4. Stalin’s policies (the destruction of military 
personnel, the pact with Hitler) meant the 
country was unprepared for war?
58% 22% 20%
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5. Only a powerful leader could have kept order 
in a country facing an acute class struggle and 
foreign threats?
56% 26% 18%
6. Our people will always need a leader like 
Stalin, someone who will restore order? 34% 50% 17%
7. Stalin is insulted by people hostile to the 
interests of the Russian people and of our state? 32% 42% 26%
8. We still don’t know the whole truth about 
Stalin and his actions? 68% 14% 19%
Source: October 2008 poll
Very few Russians are ready to subscribe to the old ideological line of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, which maintained that the repression perpetrated between  
the 1920s to the 1950s was a historic necessity because the USSR was encircled by hostile 
powers or was a result of the gravity of the “class struggle.” Nowadays, the majority of 
respondents view Stalinist repression as having been an inexcusable political crime. 
Yet, even though the majority of Russia’s population understands the cruel nature of Sta-
lin’s policies, they find it difficult to condemn Stalin as the bearer of supreme power. They 
do not acknowledge that a leader of the state (rather than a private individual, however 
influential) deserves to be brought to justice for his or her personal and legal guilt. 
In August 2009, the Levada Center asked Russians, “Considering the scale of repression 
in the Stalinist era, do you agree that the ruler of the country Joseph Stalin should be 
considered a state criminal?” Thirty-eight percent agreed, and 44 percent did not agree 
(of whom 32 percent said “on the whole I cannot say that” and 12 percent “completely 
disagreed”). In other words, a sum total of 62 percent of Russians did not agree with the 
proposition and refused to admit that there was a need to pass legal or political judgment 
on the Stalinist (or Soviet) regime.
STalin aS a Symbol
The Levada Center’s surveys show that the majority of Russians today do not want a return 
of the cult of Stalin, or even his partial rehabilitation. They oppose restoring the statues of 
Stalin that were taken down by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s, and they are also against 
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erecting new monuments in Stalin’s honor to mark the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet 
Union’s victory over Germany, as several deputies in the Russian parliament proposed. The 
majority of respondents were just as 
unequivocal in opposing the restora-
tion of the former name of the city of 
Volgograd—Stalingrad—despite the 
heroic aura that is still attached to the 
1942–1943 battle of Stalingrad.3
There was a similar breakdown of opin-
ions in the 2012 Carnegie poll. Twenty-
three percent of Russians surveyed were 
in favor of erecting a monument to 
Stalin in Moscow and 56 percent were 
against, with the remainder not having an opinion or having difficulty answering. Similarly, 
18 percent of respondents supported renaming Volgograd and 60 percent were against.
The deeply rooted fear that era still evokes and a suppressed antipathy toward Stalin is also 
revealed in Russians’ clear reluctance to live under the rule of Stalin or a similar dicta-
tor—74 percent of those surveyed in 2008 and 67 percent in 2012 said they would not 
live that way. There were similar responses in different post-Soviet republics, where the 
same question was asked (see figure 2 on page 8).
And yet the symbolic status of Stalin and the state myth that surrounds him hamper 
efforts to rationally analyze Soviet history and the real role of the totalitarian party and 
state. Proposals for “lustration” or some kind of “Nuremberg Trials” to bring to justice the 
organizers of the terror and repression in the USSR have met with firm opposition. Even 
in 1990, 62 percent of those surveyed said that television stations and the press paid too 
much attention to “criticism of Stalin” and the “exposure of the crimes of Stalin” and that 
they were fed up with this issue.  
This message was clearly articulated both in the media and in speeches by politicians: no 
more blackening of our glorious past. This theme has persisted and become an instrument 
to discredit liberals and supporters of reform. 
a Time for de-STalinizaTion
In February 2011, a group of human rights defenders and political scientists appealed to 
then president Dmitry Medvedev to initiate a broad program of de-Stalinization, without 
which, they said, the program Medvedev had unveiled for the “modernization of Russia” 
Yet the symbolic status of 
Stalin and the state myth that 
surrounds him hamper efforts 
to rationally analyze Soviet 
history and the real role of the 
totalitarian party and state.
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and the “creation of a law-based state” could not be realized. Several democratic opposi-
tion parties had similar ideas. 
But the ideologists of United Russia as well as of the Communists and nationalists fiercely 
opposed these initiatives. Loyal servants of the government saw the human rights activ-
ists’ program as a provocative move designed to “divide and destroy society” and split 
the governing class and United Russia.4 Russia’s Communist Party opposed the program 
especially strongly. 
Historian, philosopher, teacher, and Communist Party supporter Mikhail Lomakov wrote, 
“Stalin’s rule took account of the mentality of the Russian people, while the power of lib-
erals is rejected like a foreign body.” Lomakov contended that Medvedev’s modernization 
project was a “utopia,” while “against the background of what has happened over the past 
twenty years, the Soviet era, and above all the Stalin era, looks if not ideal, then at least 
[like] a romantic time, a time of achievements in toil and battle. And the symbol of that 
era is Joseph Stalin.” Along with many other commentators, Lomakov wrote that “liberals 
want to destroy Stalin because they understand that today the country has a social need 
for a personality such as Stalin because it faces the threat of full subjugation to the West.”5 
Vladimir Putin and Kremlin propaganda often deliver the message that the country faces 
a danger coming from the West, which seeks to “impose democracy on Russia” in order 
to turn it into a colony supplying Western powers with raw materials. This idea strikes 
a chord with a large section of the Russian public, because it harks back to the ideologi-
cal stereotypes of the Cold War era. The atmosphere of a closed society from that era has 
persisted, albeit in a weakened form, which is what Putin’s leadership needs above all. By 
re-creating the perception of a nation under threat by malicious enemies, the Kremlin’s 
approach disarms the criticism of Stalin—the simplest tactic is to discredit either the accu-
sations or the accusers. 
These scare tactics have only succeeded, however, with a small group of hard-core Stalin-
ists, chiefly pensioners and generally former Communist Party activists or bureaucrats. In 
2007, only 5 percent of Russians agreed with the proposition that Stalin’s political repres-
sion was an “invention, designed to defame the great leader.” But asked “Do you agree 
that the scale of the repression under Stalin has been strongly exaggerated?” around a third 
of respondents (29 percent in 1996) answered in the affirmative, although a noticeably 
higher number, 43–49 percent, did not agree. 
Another line of defense of Stalin is to say that the dictator’s persecutions were merely 
purges of the higher echelons of the party or directed at “real enemies of the people.” But 
only a relatively small number of those surveyed shared this view—18 percent and 9 per-
cent respectively in 2007, 14 and 10 percent in 2011.
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The Russian public generally believes that Stalinist repression was total and indiscrimi-
nate and that it covered all categories of the population and social groups (table 6). 
When asked in April 2011, “Who, in your opinion, should be considered the victim of 
repression in 1937–38” a relative majority—48 percent of respondents—said, “Everyone 
indiscriminately, by the whim of the authorities or denunciations.” In answering a more 
general question in the same poll, Russians held similar views. 
Table 6. Russians Believe Stalinist Repression Was Total and 
indiscriminate
Question asked: Who, in your opinion, should be considered the victims of 
Stalinist repressions?
All those convicted of political charges 71%
Only those who were shot on these charges 9%
Those convicted after being captured as prisoners of war 45%
The family members of those convicted of political charges, who were evicted 
from their homes and/or dismissed or held back in their careers 42%
Persecuted kulaks 38%
Those convicted by violations of normal judicial procedures (by “troikas” or 
expedited court orders) 36%
Deportees (including repressed ethnic groups) 29%
Those punished for violations of work discipline (being late more than 20 minutes 
and so on) 25%
Family members of those repressed for political crimes who did not suffer any 
further discrimination 10%
Have difficulty in answering 11%
Source: April 2011 poll
In other words, most of the public believes that the crimes of the Soviet authorities were 
committed against the whole Soviet population and not just a certain group. Moreover, 
it is important to note that public opinion does not regard as victims solely those who 
were slaughtered during the late 1930s, the years of the “Great Terror.” The public has a 
broader understanding of the extent of the persecution. Those persecuted included prison-
ers of war, Kulaks (slightly wealthier peasant farmers who were brutally persecuted under 
collectivization), those who were deported, and the families of those who were executed. 
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This means that the absolute majority of Russians have no trouble answering the question 
of whether or not a de-Stalinization program is necessary. Russian society already agrees 
with every point of this program and that the program itself is an idea whose time has 
come (see table 7 below).
Table 7. Russians Agree With De-Stalinization Program
Question asked: Would you personally support…?
Points of program yes No Don’t know
… Perpetuating the memory of repressed victims (creating 
books of memory for the victims of the totalitarian regime, 
erecting monuments to them in all significant cities and places 
of execution)
70% 19% 11%
… Social support for living victims of repression? 78% 12% 10%
… A state-endorsed political and legal assessment of the 
practices of mass repression? 64% 14% 22%
… The declassification of archives on the mass repressions. 68% 18% 14%
… Completing the process of judicial rehabilitation for citizens 
convicted for political reasons in different periods of Soviet 
history?
72% 13% 15%
... Adopting a law stopping the names of figures responsible for 
mass repression from being immortalized through the names of 
places, streets, and squares
53% 25% 22%
Source: May 2011 poll   
The difficulties Russia encounters in defeating the myth of Stalin do not stem from a lack 
of knowledge about Stalin’s crimes, but rather from the fact that people do not regard 
the Soviet system as having been criminal. The Russian people do not see any alternative 
to Putin’s authoritarian model because they simply do not know how the state could be 
ordered any differently. Russian society today lacks figures of recognized moral and intel-
lectual authority who are capable of making this diagnosis. 
The Russian public is not capable of interpreting the country’s past by itself. As a result, 
the people’s only reaction to their frustrated state of knowledge about Stalin’s persecutions 
is general apathy and a desire to forget about everything. Indeed, this is the reaction that 
Putin’s technology of control is intended to produce—the absence of moral clarity and the 
presence of mass apathy have become the foundations of authoritarian rule. 
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NOTES
1	 All	polls	cited	in	this	essay	that	were	conducted	in	Russia	were	carried	out	by	the	Levada	Center;	
those	in	the	Caucasus	were	conducted	by	the	Caucasus	Research	Resource	Centers	(CRRC).	In	
a	similar	survey	in	2000	that	asked	Russians	who	were	the	main	figures	in	world	politics	in	the	
twentieth	century,	Stalin	occupied	second	place,	tied	with	Hitler	and	after	Lenin	(who	was	named	by	
65	percent	of 	respondents).	Stalin	and	Hitler	were	named	by	the	same	number	of 	respondents	(51	
percent),	followed	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev	(42	percent),	Nikita	Khrushchev,	Mao	Zedong,	John	F.	
Kennedy,	Margaret	Thatcher,	and	others.	
2	 Lev	Gudkov,	“Vremya	i	istoriya	v	soznanii	rossiyan”	(Time	and	history	in	the	consciousness	of 	
Russians,	Part	2),	Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya,	2010,	no.	2	(104):	39.	
3	 The	Volgograd	council	recently	decided	to	restore	the	name	Stalingrad	for	six	days	of 	the	year—all	
associated	with	military	commemorations.	See	“Stalingrad	Name	to	Be	Revived	for	Anniversaries,”	
BBC	News,	February	1,	2013,	www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21291674.	
4	 See	the	speeches	of 	leading	politicians	on	this	subject	at	www.politonline.ru/groups/4222.html.
5	 See	“Kaluzhskiy	ekspert:	Destalinizatsiya—provokatsiya	napravlennaya	na	razval	obshchestva”	
(Kaluga	expert:	De-Stalinization	is	a	provocation	aimed	at	splitting	society),	Regnum	News	Agency,	
April	11,	2011.	www.regnum.ru/news/1392889.html. 
A Georgian Icon
Stalin is still admired in his 
homeland but more as a patriotic 
symbol than a political model.
Photographer I Guram Tsibakhashvili
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Still Living With the Great Son of the Nation
lasha bakradze
In early March 1956, mass demonstrations broke out in Georgia apparently in 
defense of Joseph Stalin. They began just before the third anniversary of Stalin’s death on 
March 5 and shortly after Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech at the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party denouncing his notorious predecessor’s “cult of person-
ality and its consequences.” They were the first mass protests in the Soviet Union against 
the central government since the 1920s. Four days later, in the center of Tbilisi, the gov-
ernment crushed the demonstrators. Troops opened fire, killing dozens of people.1
Even though the demonstrators in Tbilisi voiced Stalinist and Communist slogans, their 
public protest actually masked nationalist sentiments. As what eventually became known 
as Khrushchev’s Secret Speech was not broadcast or published at the time, a host of ru-
mors circulated about its contents. Ordinary Georgians were particularly offended by the 
rumor that Khrushchev had explained Stalin’s personality as having been shaped by his 
Georgian nationality. 
Georgians had a dogged admiration for their native son. Even those Georgians who were 
not brainwashed by Stalinist propaganda and who believed Georgia was a victim of Com-
munist rule thought of Stalin as being more than just the Soviet leader and the architect 
of the totalitarian regime. For them too, he was also a Georgian, who remained the sole 
leader of a huge empire for three decades. Georgians made a crude trade-off: the Russians 
“have us where they want us,” but “our boy has them.” 
GEORGIA AND STALIN
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Accordingly, Georgians’ attitudes toward Stalin were not directly associated with sympa-
thy for the Soviet empire or Communist ideology—and today it would be incorrect to 
assume that approval of Stalin also means approval of authoritarian rule.
THe Cobbler’S Son
Up until 1956, in Georgia, Stalin was both a Soviet and a national symbol. At a time when 
expressing “ethnocentric” attitudes was forbidden, Georgians were able to take pride in 
their nationality by revering Georgian-born Stalin. The small house in Gori in which Iosif 
Jugashvili, son of a cobbler, had been born and that later became the center of the Stalin 
Museum was a kind of Soviet shrine as important as Lenin’s Mausoleum in Red Square. 
In 1928, the Georgian poet Galaktion Tabidze wrote of Stalin’s house in Gori, “here is the 
secret of a little hut, the secret of mankind.” A few lines later, Tabidze wrote scathingly 
of the house’s inhabitant, “He does not have a real name, his name is Legion”—quot-
ing a famous reference in the Gospels to Satan. In other words, even those who did not 
love Stalin saw him as a kind of Übermensch or superman and could enjoy some of his 
reflected glory. 
This ambiguity has a fairly simple explanation: Georgia’s small size fosters a sense of infe-
riority among some Georgians that their country cannot become “great.” In the twelfth 
century, an anonymous historian wrote of the famous Georgian king, David the Builder, 
“If David [were] the King of the Persians or had forces like the Greeks and Romans or 
other big kingdoms, then the world could have seen actions which surpassed ones that were 
praised before his time.” Eight centuries later, Stalin became that imaginary, feared king.
The violent breakup of the March 1956 demonstrations ultimately led to the collapse of 
Communist ideology in Georgia. Given this very national perspective on Stalin, the rea-
sons why are clear. The protests increased the antipathy Georgians felt for Soviet rule and 
even buried the belief in that leadership, triggering an upsurge of Georgian nationalism in 
Soviet times. 
Despite Stalin’s leadership, Georgians did not feel a close affinity for the myths created by 
the Soviet Union. The idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” and even the Soviet Union’s 
Great Patriotic War against the Nazis are not national myths for Georgians. 
Georgia endured huge losses in the war of 1941–1945, suffering the greatest loss of life of 
any Soviet republic that did not see fighting on its territory. Accordingly, the poll commis-
sioned by the Carnegie Endowment, and conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource 
Centers (CRRC) and the Levada Center in October and November 2012, shows that 
Georgians take an even higher level of pride than Russians in Stalin’s role in winning the 
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war with Nazi Germany. But the heroic legend of the Great Patriotic War does not have 
the same hold over Georgians as it does over Russians, and many Georgians associate the 
victory with their national leader, Stalin, rather than the Soviet Union. There is even a 
wide and generally positive interest in stories about the much smaller number of Geor-
gians who fought against the Soviet Union in the Germans’ so-called “Georgian Legion.” 
They are not considered traitors in Georgia in the same way “Vlasovites” who fought with 
the Nazis are generally regarded in Russia. 
Georgians and Russians express approval of Stalin for different reasons. Whereas in Russia, 
Stalin is a symbol of order and autocracy, in Georgia, he is regarded more as a rebel, who 
came from a colonized nation, fought 
against the existing order, and broke the 
rules by rising to the top of a system led 
by Russians.
One consequence of this weak identi-
fication with Soviet power is that since 
the fall of the USSR, Georgia has not 
had—in contrast to Russia—an influ-
ential Communist Party and few feel 
strong nostalgia for the Soviet past. It 
is hard to find people in Georgia who 
share the view famously uttered by Vladimir Putin in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For the Russian people it 
was a real drama.” 
For many Georgians, Stalin thus simply remains a strong personality whom the whole 
world held in fear. As such, he has turned into an object of local patriotism and popular 
devotion. In but one example, a picture of the powerful cobbler’s son, portrayed as a saint 
and patron of cobblers, still hangs in a Georgian shoe mender’s workshop next to the icon 
of the Virgin Mary (see photo on page 45).  
THe miSSing de-STalinizaTion debaTe
Despite Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, a full-scale process of de-Stalinization did not take 
place in the Soviet Union, including in Georgia. Unlike other totalitarian regimes, such  
as Nazi Germany, where de-Nazification and a reevaluation of history began as soon as the 
regime was defeated in 1945, the Soviet system did not cease to exist but merely became 
less repressive. Men who shared the responsibility for Stalin’s crimes (including Khrushchev 
himself ) remained the leaders of the Soviet state and no one questioned the Communist 
In Georgia, Stalin is regarded 
more as a rebel, who came from a 
colonized nation, fought against 
the existing order, and broke the 
rules by rising to the top of a 
system led by Russians.
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ideology that had helped install the totalitarian regime in the first place. The men who had 
built and perpetuated this regime never had to answer for their actions. 
As a result, Soviet society never underwent the same reassessment of its history as post-
1945 Germany. The broader public took an interest in their modern history but were in-
formed about it only thirty-five years or so after the death of Stalin, in Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
perestroika era and as the Soviet Union 
broke apart. Because no work was done 
to inform and enlighten people about 
the evils of totalitarianism, Stalin never 
became a symbol of evil as unaccept-
able as Hitler. The cultural perception 
of this dictator was different. 
After Georgia regained its indepen-
dence in 1991–1992, there was no 
interest in any serious analysis of recent history as the country wrestled instead with com-
plex social and political problems. On May 9, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the victory 
over Nazi Germany, then Georgian president (and former Communist Party leader) Edu-
ard Shevardnadze went to the Stalin Museum in Gori and said that it needed to become 
a center to study the “phenomenon” of Stalin—a word that carried positive connotations. 
But nothing came of the proposal.
This ambiguous situation unfortunately persists to this day. The decade that followed 
Shevardnadze’s ouster in the 2003 Rose Revolution has been dominated by the rule of 
Georgia’s pro-Western president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and filled with much anti-Russian 
and anti-Communist rhetoric as well as criticism of Stalin. However, there has been no 
serious historical or political research conducted during this period on Stalin’s era that 
has been made available to or attracted the attention of Georgian society as a whole. The 
Museum of the Soviet Occupation, opened by Saakashvili’s government in 2006, was set 
up with a propagandistic agenda and has not increased public knowledge about the Soviet 
era in general and the Stalinist period in particular. 2
A few documentaries have been shown on Georgia’s Public Television Channel, but their 
content has been superficial. School textbooks do not provide young people with deep 
knowledge of the Soviet era, and Soviet history is practically not taught in universities. An 
initiative to rename the Museum of Stalin in Gori the Museum of Stalinism did not result 
in any public debate in Georgia, and evidently the government had no interest in such a 
debate occurring. 
Moreover, several poorly executed anti-Stalin initiatives may have caused a backlash. In 
2010 the Georgian government had the famous Stalin statue in the central square of Gori 
taken down at night, again without any public discussion. In May 2011 President Saa-
Because no work was done to 
inform and enlighten people 
about the evils of totalitarianism, 
Stalin never became a symbol of 
evil as unacceptable as Hitler. 
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kashvili signed a law ordering that all “Soviet and fascist symbols” (such as hammers and 
sickles and stars) be erased from public buildings. 
It is impossible to prove empirically that Georgian society disapproved of these steps 
because there has been no sociological research on this issue. In fact, there was no opinion 
poll on Stalin before the one Carnegie commissioned in 2012, indicating either indiffer-
ence or an unwillingness to acknowledge that Stalin is still revered in Georgia. 
Due to this lack of data, changes in Georgians’ attitudes toward Stalin over the last two 
decades cannot be tracked, unlike in Russia. But less than three months after Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement was defeated in the parliamentary elections of 
October 2012 and the ideological pressures it had been exerting ceased, the population 
of the village of Zemo Alvani in northeastern Georgia decided to restore their statue of 
Stalin—which had been removed in 2011—to its plinth. The local authorities in Stalin’s 
birthplace of Gori are also considering reerecting their own statue of Stalin, although they 
intend to put it in front of the Stalin Museum rather than in its former position in the 
city’s nearby central square.3
georgian publiC opinion Today
Up until now the main source of information on Georgians’ opinions of Stalin was a 
television show—“The 10 Greatest Georgians”—broadcast by Georgian Public Television 
in 2009. To the surprise of many, Stalin did not even make the short list of 50 candidates, 
while the great nineteenth-century Georgian writer and public figure Ilya Chavchavadze 
won the greatest support. Given the results of the Carnegie opinion poll, it looks as 
though the vote count on the show may have been manipulated. (In similar fashion, in 
Russia, there was speculation that Stalin’s demotion down a list of ratings of historical 
figures on the television program “The Name of Russia” in December 2008 was due to 
intervention by the government.)
According to the Carnegie poll, a shockingly high proportion of Georgians—45 per-
cent—have a positive attitude toward Stalin. Even in Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the 
mythologized emotional connection to Stalin is much weaker than in Russia or Georgia, 
Stalin wins a fairly high approval rat-
ing. The most surprising result is from 
Azerbaijan, where almost one-quarter of 
respondents, 22 percent, and 39 percent 
of young people say they do not know 
who Stalin is. This result suggests that 
the name of Stalin is barely present in 
the current Azerbaijani education system. 
A shockingly high proportion of 
Georgians—45 percent—have a 
positive attitude toward Stalin.
52          THE STALIN PUZZLE   Bakradze
A more precise breakdown of Georgian attitudes by age and social group does not reveal 
significant differences across society. For example, positive attitudes toward Stalin cannot 
be explained by a lack of education alone. 
As expected, those Georgians that have achieved higher levels of education have less posi-
tive attitudes toward Stalin than those with only secondary education and especially those 
with secondary technical education. But the respondents’ answers to questions related to 
Stalin’s persecutions demonstrate that level of education does not make a big difference in 
attitudes. There are small, although statistically significant differences (with results ranging 
from 23 to 26 percent) in the percentage of Georgians of varying levels of education who 
approve of the statement that Stalin’s acts of repression were historically justified. Similar-
ly, the population of Tbilisi is more critical of Stalin than are other areas of Georgia, but 
there are also no great differences in opinion by geography. 
The results also show that a positive attitude toward Stalin is not a matter of a dream of a 
“firm hand.” Sixty-six percent of the population of Tbilisi, 66 percent of respondents with 
higher education, and 64 percent of younger respondents (aged between eighteen and 
thirty) register their strong disapproval for an authoritarian style of government when they 
say that they would not like to live and work under a leader like Stalin. 
An astonishing 72 percent of Georgian pensioners harbor positive feelings toward Sta-
lin—and this is despite the fact that a much smaller number of them, 35 percent, believe 
that the sacrifices the Soviet people suffered under his rule were justified. The power of 
nostalgia provides some kind of explanation for these views, but it is worth recalling that 
during Stalin’s era the majority of today’s pensioners were extremely young. Their sym-
pathy for Stalin is probably more the 
result of nostalgia for the relative stabil-
ity and prosperity of the late Soviet 
period, in particular the Brezhnev years 
of 1964–1982, which saw a partial 
rehabilitation of Stalin. 
Young people are a slightly different 
matter. Almost a quarter of young 
Georgians (aged eighteen to thirty) 
describe their attitude toward Stalin as being one of indifference. More than a quarter 
either refuse to answer a question about their attitude toward Stalin, do not know how to 
answer, or say they do not know who Stalin is. In general, “I don’t know” answers to these 
questions is also a sign of indifference and lack of knowledge. 
Interestingly, attitudes toward Russia among Georgian respondents do not appear to 
strongly correlate with their opinions of Stalin. Views of Stalin are less positive among 
Sympathy for Stalin is probably 
more the result of nostalgia 
for the relative stability 
and prosperity of the late 
Soviet period.
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respondents who consider Russia to be Georgia’s main enemy than among the rest of the 
population as a whole—but the variations in opinion are not so marked as to suggest that 
attitudes toward Stalin depend on sympathy or antipathy for Russia. 
an imporTanT Symbol
So the unfortunate conclusion stemming from the Carnegie survey results is that across 
Georgian society there are few significant differences in attitudes toward Stalin—which 
are in general positive. These results show that in spite of the accelerated modernization 
Georgia has undergone since the Rose Revolution of 2003, changes have been superfi-
cial and the consciousness of Georgians is not much different. Despite or perhaps even 
because of the strong anti-Soviet ideology of the country in the past few years, Georgian 
society is still in the grip of Soviet-style thinking, and even Georgian nationalism still has 
a quite Soviet character. 
Yet, this disappointing observation needs to be qualified: admiration for Stalin does not 
overlap with support for an authoritarian system of government. Responding to different 
questions posed in the same 2012 survey by CRRC, 68 percent of Georgians said they 
support the idea of democracy. Georgia’s much more authoritarian neighbor, Azerbaijan, 
meanwhile, displays the strongest anti-Stalin feelings of all the four countries in the  
Carnegie survey. 
So for many Georgians, paradoxically, Stalin is still an important symbol but one without 
strong political content. What this poll underlines is that Georgian society is still unre-
flective and conservative—and indeed 
has become more conservative recently. 
Georgians have a tendency to avoid 
discussion of painful topics and find it 
difficult to reevaluate values. And a reas-
sessment has failed to take place regard-
ing one of its most enduring legends—
the “famous son of Georgia,” Stalin. 
Sixty years after the death of Stalin, his statue in his birthplace of Gori has been taken 
down only, it would seem, to be moved to a new site 500 meters away. So far Georgians 
have failed to rid their minds of the influence of the great dictator. 
 
 
Georgian society is still in the 
grip of Soviet-style thinking, and 
even Georgian nationalism still 
has a quite Soviet character. 
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NOTES
1	 See,	for	example,	Timothy	Blauvelt,	“Status	Shift	and	Ethnic	Mobilization	in	the	March	1956	
Events	in	Georgia,”	Europe-Asia Studies,		vol.		61,	no.	4,	June	2009.	Many	original	documents	both	
on	Khrushchev’s	Secret	Speech	and	on	the	March	events	in	Tbilisi	can	be	found	at	www.idfi.
ge/archive/?cat=show_db&lang=en&db_id=19		and	www.rusarchives.ru/evants/exhibitions/
xxconvention_exp.shtml.
2	 Until	recently,	the	museum	mixed	Soviet	and	post-Soviet	history	in	tendentious	fashion,	showing	film	
images	of 	the	Rose	Revolution	and	Russia’s	2008	war	with	Georgia.
3	 “Georgian	Village	Reinstates	Stalin	Monument	to	Mark	Anniversary,”	Reuters,	December	21,	2012,
	 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/21/oukoe-uk-georgia-stalin-idUKBRE8BK0VP20121221;	
	 “Pamyatnik	Stalinu	na	ego	rodine	budet	vosstanovlen”	(Monument	to	Stalin	in	his	homeland	in	Gori	
will	be	restored),	Ekho	Moskvy,		December	21,	2012,	www.echo.msk.ru/news/973910-echo.html.	
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Admiration 3 5 2 3 3 4 7 3 3 3 4 4 3
Respect 16 20 13 16 17 17 25 15 17 16 12 18 19
Approval 6 8 5 6 5 6 11 7 6 6 7 5 7
Indifference 25 22 27 25 28 24 15 23 25 28 28 22 25
Antipathy, 
irritation 15 13 16 15 13 16 14 21 16 11 20 13 12
Fear 8 6 10 8 9 9 9 7 6 9 5 11 9
Disgust, hatred 12 13 11 12 13 14 14 16 15 9 14 11 12
I don’t know 
who Stalin is 8 8 9 8 7 4 1 4 6 11 7 10 9
Difficulty 
answering 6 5 6 6 6 7 5 5 5 7 5 6 6
Refuse to 
answer 0 0 0 - - 0 0 - - 0 - 0 0
SEx
1. Which of these words best describes your attitude toward Stalin?
2. would you like to live and work in a country ruled by a person like Stalin?
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
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Definitely yes 11 15 8 5 9 13 20 8 13 11 7 14 12
Probably yes 11 12 10 6 12 11 17 8 11 12 6 14 13
Probably no 16 16 16 16 17 16 16 12 16 18 17 17 15
Definitely no 56 52 59 66 55 55 43 68 53 52 66 49 53
Difficulty 
answering 6 5 7 7 7 5 4 4 7 7 4 6 7
Refuse to 
answer 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 0
Completely 
agree 27 31 24 19 25 31 37 23 30 27 24 32 27
Mostly agree 28 30 26 27 27 31 25 28 27 30 27 28 29
Mostly disagree 13 12 14 14 14 11 12 16 13 12 17 11 11
Completely 
disagree 20 17 22 21 20 19 18 26 19 16 23 18 18
Difficulty 
answering 12 10 14 18 13 8 7 6 11 15 8 12 15
Refuse to 
answer 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 - 1 1 0 0
Completely 
agree 39 44 35 33 38 41 47 36 37 40 35 45 38
Mostly agree 30 30 30 31 32 31 25 31 31 30 33 29 29
Mostly disagree 10 8 11 9 10 9 11 11 11 9 10 9 11
Completely 
disagree 10 9 11 10 9 11 10 15 9 8 12 9 10
Difficulty 
answering 11 8 13 16 10 8 7 6 12 13 10 9 13
Refuse to 
answer 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 - 1 1 0 0
SEx
3. “Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.”
4. “For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing is that under  
his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War.”
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
2. would you like to live and work in a country ruled by a person like Stalin?
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Completely 
agree 49 48 51 48 52 51 45 57 51 45 58 50 41
Mostly agree 20 20 20 21 20 22 19 22 17 20 22 19 21
Mostly disagree 10 11 8 8 10 10 13 7 11 11 6 11 12
Completely 
disagree 8 8 7 4 7 8 12 6 8 8 5 8 10
Difficulty 
answering 13 12 13 18 11 9 10 7 12 16 9 12 16
Refuse to 
answer 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Completely 
agree 24 27 21 15 25 25 33 20 26 23 19 31 22
Mostly agree 14 16 13 14 14 15 15 13 15 16 14 12 16
Mostly disagree 16 16 17 18 17 17 12 18 13 18 19 15 16
Completely 
disagree 34 32 35 39 32 33 30 40 36 28 40 30 31
Difficulty 
answering 12 9 14 15 12 10 10 9 10 14 8 12 15
Refuse to 
answer 0 0 1 - 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
SEx
5. “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of innocent people.”
6. “Our people will always have a need of a leader like Stalin,  
who will come and restore order.”
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It was politically 
necessary; they 
were historically 
justified
23 29 18 16 25 26 26 22 23 25 21 25 23
It was a political 
crime; there is no 
justification for it.
55 51 57 60 53 54 49 62 55 51 64 48 51
I know 
nothing about 
these repressions.
3 4 3 5 3 3 2 2 3 4 1 5 4
Difficulty 
answering 19 16 21 19 18 17 21 14 18 20 14 20 21
Refuse to answer 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Definitely yes 47 43 51 49 47 48 42 55 49 42 53 43 44
Probably yes 27 32 23 24 28 28 28 26 29 29 30 26 25
Definitely cannot 
be justified 5 7 4 2 6 6 8 4 5 6 3 7 6
Difficulty 
answering 20 18 22 24 19 17 21 14 16 22 13 23 24
Refuse to answer 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SEx
7. Which of the following opinions about Stalin’s acts  
of repression do you most agree with?
8. In your opinion, can the sacrifices which the Soviet Union people endured  
under Stalin be justified by the results achieved in a short period?
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
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Admiration 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 3 1 1 2 2
Respect 13 14 12 6 11 19 28 11 17 12 13 13 14
Approval 6 8 5 3 5 9 11 9 8 4 7 4 7
Indifference 15 15 16 16 16 17 8 12 15 18 15 9 19
Antipathy, 
irritation 6 9 4 6 8 5 7 11 9 5 5 9 5
Fear 11 9 12 8 11 12 14 7 12 11 5 15 11
Disgust, 
hatred 16 18 15 15 16 18 19 30 16 15 25 15 12
I don’t know 
who Stalin is 22 19 24 39 20 8 5 11 10 24 22 23 21
Difficulty 
answering 8 7 9 7 10 8 6 7 7 8 6 10 8
Refuse to 
answer 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
Definitely yes 5 5 4 3 4 6 10 2 5 4 3 7 5
Probably yes 10 12 7 7 9 12 14 14 13 7 15 9 7
Probably no 23 24 22 24 20 23 26 18 24 23 17 19 29
Definitely no 50 49 51 54 54 48 38 60 48 52 61 52 42
Difficulty 
answering 12 9 15 12 13 11 12 6 10 13 3 13 17
Refuse to 
answer 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
SEx
1. Which of these words best describes your attitude toward Stalin?
2. would you like to live and work in a country ruled by a person like Stalin?
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Completely 
agree 18 20 16 12 15 20 32 17 18 15 18 17 19
Mostly agree 26 27 25 23 26 29 25 30 27 24 35 18 25
Mostly disagree 14 16 13 13 17 14 12 16 16 15 17 15 13
Completely 
disagree 21 20 22 22 22 19 22 28 21 20 18 30 18
Difficulty 
answering 19 15 23 29 17 17 7 8 16 24 10 19 24
Refuse to 
answer 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2
Completely 
agree 35 36 33 26 32 39 49 31 38 33 31 35 37
Mostly agree 37 36 38 42 37 35 29 44 33 35 51 30 32
Mostly disagree 8 9 6 6 8 8 9 10 9 8 7 9 7
Completely 
disagree 8 9 8 8 9 9 6 9 11 8 4 14 7
Difficulty 
answering 11 9 13 16 12 8 5 5 9 13 5 11 15
Refuse to 
answer 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 3 2 1
SEx
3. “Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.”
4. “For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing is that under  
his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War.”
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Completely 
agree 43 43 43 47 44 38 43 60 43 40 55 44 34
Mostly agree 25 27 23 20 26 28 26 22 27 25 28 19 27
Mostly disagree 7 9 6 4 7 9 11 8 8 7 6 7 8
Completely 
disagree 6 7 5 6 5 7 6 3 6 6 2 8 7
Difficulty 
answering 16 12 21 21 16 14 11 6 15 19 4 19 23
Refuse to 
answer 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 1 2 4 5 3 2
Completely 
agree 7 8 6 6 6 8 12 4 7 6 6 8 8
Mostly agree 11 12 11 7 12 13 17 14 13 10 12 9 13
Mostly disagree 13 13 12 12 11 16 12 11 12 13 13 14 12
Completely 
disagree 50 52 47 57 53 45 40 61 46 50 62 49 42
Difficulty 
answering 15 11 18 16 14 14 16 8 15 17 4 18 20
Refuse to 
answer 4 3 5 3 4 5 3 3 7 4 4 2 5
SEx
5. “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of innocent people.”
6. “Our people will always have a need of a leader like Stalin,  
who will come and restore order.”
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
62          THE STALIN PUZZLE 
AZERbAIJAN, %
Ev
er
yo
ne
M
en
W
om
en
18
–3
0
31
–4
5
46
–6
0
61
+
Hi
gh
er
Se
co
nd
ar
y/
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l
Se
co
nd
ar
y
ba
ku
Ot
he
r t
ow
ns
vi
lla
ge
s
It was politically 
necessary; they 
were historically 
justified
19 22 15 12 18 21 31 16 20 19 20 14 22
It was a political 
crime; there is no 
justification for it.
57 59 55 56 60 56 53 73 58 53 63 63 49
I know 
nothing about 
these repressions.
10 7 13 17 9 8 3 5 6 12 8 8 12
Difficulty 
answering 13 10 16 14 12 12 11 6 13 14 7 15 15
Refuse to answer 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 2
Definitely yes 7 7 8 7 5 7 13 6 8 7 13 6 4
Probably yes 20 22 19 14 20 23 27 21 21 20 20 17 23
Definitely cannot 
be justified 50 53 47 52 51 49 45 62 48 48 53 58 43
Difficulty 
answering 20 17 24 27 21 17 12 11 20 23 12 18 27
Refuse to answer 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 4 3 2 2 3
SEx
7. Which of the following opinions about Stalin’s acts  
of repression do you most agree with?
8. In your opinion, can the sacrifices which the Soviet Union people endured  
under Stalin be justified by the results achieved in a short period?
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Admiration 3 3 3 1 1 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 3
Respect 27 29 26 18 24 30 38 23 31 28 23 26 31
Approval 15 16 14 11 9 16 26 14 17 15 15 13 17
Indifference 15 13 17 22 18 13 7 20 16 10 21 18 10
Antipathy, 
irritation 9 9 8 10 11 9 5 12 7 8 14 8 6
Fear 7 5 9 7 8 8 6 9 7 7 10 7 6
Disgust, 
hatred 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 5 3
I don’t know 
who Stalin is 5 6 5 10 6 4 2 3 2 9 1 4 9
Difficulty 
answering 13 12 13 16 16 11 6 10 12 15 9 15 13
Refuse to 
answer 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 0 2 4
Definitely yes 13 14 12 4 7 16 26 9 16 13 9 10 18
Probably yes 11 12 11 5 9 14 18 8 15 11 6 10 16
Probably no 13 13 13 11 14 13 15 13 13 15 12 12 15
Definitely no 50 50 50 64 58 46 30 66 44 41 66 52 39
Difficulty 
answering 12 9 14 13 11 11 11 4 11 18 7 14 12
Refuse to 
answer 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1
SEx
1. Which of these words best describes your attitude toward Stalin?
2. would you like to live and work in a country ruled by a person like Stalin?
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
64          THE STALIN PUZZLE 
GEORGIA, %
Ev
er
yo
ne
M
en
W
om
en
18
–3
0
31
–4
5
46
–6
0
61
+
Hi
gh
er
Se
co
nd
ar
y/
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Tb
ili
si
Ot
he
r t
ow
ns
vi
lla
ge
s
Completely 
agree 34 37 33 20 30 38 50 33 40 34 34 28 39
Mostly agree 34 37 32 33 34 35 36 35 34 34 33 34 35
Mostly disagree 10 9 11 13 12 8 6 12 9 7 14 13 5
Completely 
disagree 6 4 7 8 6 5 2 9 4 3 10 7 2
Difficulty 
answering 14 12 16 24 15 11 6 9 12 19 10 17 15
Refuse to 
answer 2 2 2 3 3 3 0 2 1 3 0 2 3
Completely 
agree 42 44 41 29 34 49 57 39 47 41 42 37 45
Mostly agree 34 34 34 36 35 33 32 37 36 30 34 37 32
Mostly disagree 7 6 7 8 10 5 4 8 6 7 11 6 4
Completely 
disagree 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 9 2 2 4 4 1
Difficulty 
answering 13 12 14 21 17 8 5 5 10 17 8 14 15
Refuse to 
answer 2 2 2 3 2 3 0 2 0 3 0 2 3
SEx
3. “Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.”
4. “For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing is that under  
his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War.”
AGE EDUCATION PLACES OF RESIDENCE
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE           65 
GEORGIA, %
Ev
er
yo
ne
M
en
W
om
en
18
–3
0
31
–4
5
46
–6
0
61
+
Hi
gh
er
Se
co
nd
ar
y/
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l
Se
co
nd
ar
y
Tb
ili
si
Ot
he
r t
ow
ns
vi
lla
ge
s
Completely 
agree 26 27 26 31 30 27 17 34 24 22 39 24 20
Mostly agree 27 28 27 25 28 29 27 29 29 25 26 29 27
Mostly disagree 17 18 16 11 16 18 24 15 19 16 14 15 20
Completely 
disagree 7 7 7 2 4 8 14 6 9 6 6 5 9
Difficulty 
answering 20 17 22 27 21 16 15 13 18 27 14 24 20
Refuse to 
answer 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 4 1 3 4
Completely 
agree 10 10 10 6 5 11 19 7 11 10 7 6 14
Mostly agree 17 18 16 9 15 19 25 13 19 18 13 16 20
Mostly disagree 22 24 21 24 22 22 21 26 24 19 22 27 19
Completely 
disagree 27 27 27 34 31 26 15 37 23 21 43 23 20
Difficulty 
answering 22 20 25 26 24 20 19 14 21 30 14 25 26
Refuse to 
answer 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 2
SEx
5. “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of innocent people.”
6. “Our people will always have a need of a leader like Stalin,  
who will come and restore order.”
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It was politically 
necessary; they 
were historically 
justified
26 29 23 18 25 28 34 27 30 23 28 21 29
It was a political 
crime; there is no 
justification for it.
45 45 45 46 45 46 40 52 42 39 56 47 37
I know 
nothing about 
these repressions.
6 5 7 12 6 3 3 4 4 9 4 3 9
Difficulty 
answering 21 18 23 21 22 20 19 15 21 26 12 25 23
Refuse to answer 3 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 1 4 3
Definitely yes 5 6 4 3 4 5 7 4 6 5 4 3 6
Probably yes 24 27 21 17 22 25 32 25 26 22 28 17 26
Definitely cannot 
be justified 45 45 45 50 48 46 36 52 41 44 52 45 41
Difficulty 
answering 25 20 29 28 26 21 23 18 26 28 15 32 26
Refuse to answer 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 1
SEx
7. Which of the following opinions about Stalin’s acts  
of repression do you most agree with?
8. In your opinion, can the sacrifices which the Soviet Union people endured  
under Stalin be justified by the results achieved in a short period?
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Admiration 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.7 1.3 2.2 0.7 1.8 1.8 1.4 -- 1.0 1.8 0.3 3.0
Respect 20.7 22.4 19.2 16.2 15.3 17.5 30.6 19.0 19.1 19.0 26.8 13.8 20.3 16.2 21.1 26.0
Approval 5.7 5.9 5.6 3.2 4.1 6.3 7.8 4.2 6.3 7.0 5.9 4.3 4.9 3.7 8.2 6.1
Indifference 32.6 33.0 32.4 40.6 37.2 33.2 24.1 34.3 32.8 31.9 30.7 26.8 28.3 35.8 39.0 30.3
Antipathy, 
irritation 12.1 11.6 12.7 7.5 14.7 14.6 9.6 15.0 12.4 9.2 10.2 15.1 14.2 14.8 9.9 9.5
Fear 6.6 5.3 7.7 8.7 7.9 6.7 4.2 6.1 6.8 7.2 6.4 13.9 7.0 6.1 4.3 6.3
Disgust, 
hatred 4.1 3.8 4.4 2.5 3.0 4.8 5.4 5.2 4.2 4.1 2.6 16.7 3.2 5.0 2.0 2.3
I don’t know 
who Stalin is 1.1 0.7 1.4 2.5 1.6 0.7 0.4 1.2 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 2.5 1.2 0.4
Difficulty 
answering 10.6 10.5 10.6 11.8 11.3 9.7 10.1 9.9 10.1 13.9 9.2 7.7 14.5 9.1 8.5 11.0
Refuse to 
answer 5.0 5.6 4.6 5.3 4.1 5.1 5.7 4.3 5.3 4.2 6.3 1.0 5.9 5.1 5.5 5.1
Definitely yes 5.2 5.6 4.9 4.0 2.3 4.6 9.0 2.7 5.8 4.9 7.9 3.6 5.1 4.1 3.9 7.7
Probably yes 13.3 12.9 13.6 10.0 8.6 12.2 20.3 9.0 13.6 14.6 17.8 8.7 9.1 9.1 15.1 19.9
Probably no 32.6 35.4 30.2 25.8 33.9 36.5 31.1 36.9 32.9 29.7 28.6 32.9 32.0 31.1 37.4 29.7
Definitely no 34.1 32.3 35.7 39.3 40.1 34.3 25.9 38.2 33.1 33.9 30.1 43.5 38.5 41.1 29.2 26.7
Difficulty 
answering 8.9 7.8 9.9 14.4 10.1 6.7 7.4 7.7 9.0 10.8 9.0 7.2 7.9 9.6 8.2 10.6
Refuse to 
answer 5.9 6.0 5.7 6.5 5.1 5.8 6.3 5.4 5.6 6.1 6.6 4.0 7.4 5.0 6.2 5.5
SEx
1. Which of these words best describes your attitude toward Stalin?
2. would you like to live and work in a country ruled by a person like Stalin?
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Completely 
agree 14.8 14.4 15.1 13.0 11.6 11.8 21.3 12.2 13.8 13.3 21.3 9.5 17.2 14.3 11.5 17.8
Mostly agree 32.0 32.3 31.8 26.9 30.1 33.6 34.8 31.6 32.8 35.2 28.7 25.7 31.6 28.2 38.7 31.1
Mostly disagree 25.1 25.7 24.6 25.9 25.9 27.7 21.6 25.9 26.7 21.4 24.8 23.8 22.1 22.9 27.0 28.1
Completely 
disagree 13.0 12.9 13.2 7.6 14.4 15.8 11.7 17.0 11.3 12.8 10.4 36.6 13.5 14.4 7.2 9.4
Difficulty 
answering 10.0 10.0 9.9 19.5 13.5 7.0 5.0 8.3 11.9 11.6 8.1 3.5 10.3 14.0 9.6 9.3
Refuse to 
answer 5.0 4.8 5.3 6.9 4.5 4.0 5.6 5.0 3.6 5.6 6.7 0.8 5.3 6.2 6.1 4.3
Completely 
agree 20.0 19.6 20.4 16.9 14.1 20.0 27.1 18.2 16.1 21.4 27.4 9.4 22.6 19.7 15.5 25.6
Mostly agree 40.3 40.7 40.0 38.4 42.6 42.0 37.6 38.8 45.0 41.4 34.3 36.5 33.4 42.9 49.0 37.9
Mostly disagree 18.1 18.8 17.4 17.3 16.9 20.9 17.0 20.5 17.8 16.8 16.3 18.8 20.3 13.5 18.8 18.5
Completely 
disagree 9.3 9.2 9.3 8.0 9.9 9.9 8.6 11.9 8.3 6.3 9.7 30.6 7.2 10.1 4.6 7.9
Difficulty 
answering 7.5 7.3 7.7 12.1 11.2 5.5 3.8 6.3 8.0 9.6 6.7 3.7 9.5 9.6 5.9 7.0
Refuse to 
answer 4.8 4.5 5.0 7.3 5.3 1.8 5.9 4.4 4.8 4.5 5.6 1.0 7.0 4.2 6.2 3.2
SEx
3. “Stalin was a wise leader who brought the Soviet Union to might and prosperity.”
4. “For all Stalin’s mistakes and misdeeds, the most important thing is that under  
his leadership the Soviet people won the Great Patriotic War.”
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Completely 
agree 25.6 24.8 26.4 23.8 29.3 26.3 22.4 29.0 25.3 21.1 25.4 41.0 29.3 30.5  20.8 18.4
Mostly agree 39.5 41.3 38.0 37.5 43.6 41.6 34.7 40.3 40.4 39.3 37.1 36.3 36.7 38.7 43.2 40.2
Mostly disagree 13.4 12.3 14.4 11.2 8.7 15.0 17.5 12.6 11.8 12.8 17.7 7.4 12.1 9.9 13.8 18.9
Completely 
disagree 5.6 6.8 4.5 4.1 3.2 4.0 9.9 5.5 5.0 5.5 6.7 5.6 5.7 4.4 5.3 6.6
Difficulty 
answering 9.6 9.5 9.7 14.7 11.5 9.1 5.9 8.4 11.0 13.0 6.1 7.6 9.5 11.6 9.0 9.4
Refuse to 
answer 6.2 5.3 7.1 8.6 3.6 4.0 9.6 4.2 6.4 8.2 7.1 2.0 6.8 4.9 7.8 6.6
Completely 
agree 10.0 11.4 8.8 8.1 7.9 8.9 13.9 6.9 10.6 9.7 13.8 3.5 9.8 12.3 7.5 13.1
Mostly agree 20.0 20.6 19.5 13.9 15.5 21.9 25.3 17.7 20.3 20.0 22.8 10.3 21.6 14.5 21.1 24.7
Mostly disagree 26.6 28.0 25.4 25.5 26.4 30.5 23.7 28.3 26.9 24.9 25.1 22.3 27.4 28.2 29.4 23.5
Completely 
disagree 25.2 24.0 26.3 23.3 30.7 24.7 21.3 28.7 23.8 23.4 24.1 49.9 22.2 24.3 21.5 23.9
Difficulty 
answering 10.3 8.5 11.8 17.0 12.7 9.5 5.6 10.5 11.1 13.7 5.6 9.1 11.5 13.4 10.0 7.6
Refuse to 
answer 7.9 7.5 8.3 12.2 6.8 4.6 10.1 7.9  7.3 8.3  8.6 4.9 7.5 7.4 10.6 7.2
SEx
5. “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant, responsible for the deaths of innocent people.”
6. “Our people will always have a need of a leader like Stalin,  
who will come and restore order.”
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It was 
politically 
necessary; they 
were histori-
cally justified
22.3 23.4 1.3 19.8 17.6 21.7 28.4 20.2 24.8 19.6 23.6 17.1 21.7 21.5 22.4 24.9
It was a 
political crime; 
there is no 
justification 
for it.
51.1 49.8 52.2 44.2 51.3 57.1 48.7 55.3 48.6 51.0 49.0 61.2 52.6 53.5 46.8 48.8
I know 
nothing about 
these 
repressions.
6.3 6.4 6.2 13.4 7.7 3.3 4.3 5.6 6.0 7.8 6.5 5.3 4.3 5.5 7.6 7.7
Difficulty 
answering 12.8 12.3 13.2 13.7 15.6 11.4 10.9 12.0 13.5 12.6 12.9 12.2 13.2 11.8 14.4 11.8
Refuse to 
answer 7.5 8.1 7.1 8.9 7.8 6.4 7.7 6.9  7.1 8.9 8.0 4.2 8.2 7.7 8.9 6.7
Definitely yes 4.1 4.2 4 4.1 4.6 2.3 5.3 3.5 4.2 4.8 4.4 1.6 4.6 3.2 3.6 5.6
Probably yes 20.7 23.2 18.5 18.4 18.6 23.6 21.1 17.8 24 20.3 19.9 16.6 24.1 17.1 23.1 19.4
Definitely can 
not be justified 60.3 58.8 61.7 52.6 61.5 62 61.3 67.6 57.5 55.4 58.6 71.1 59.5 67 55.4 57.3
Difficulty 
answering 7.9 8 7.9 16.3 8.5 5.4 5.9 6.5 6.9 11.1 9.2 4.3 6.9 9 9 8.3
Refuse to 
answer 6.9 5.7 7.9 8.7 6.8 6.7 6.4 4.6 7.5 8.4 7.9 6.4 4.9 3.7 8.9 9.3
SEx
7. Which of the following opinions about Stalin’s acts  
8. In your opinion, can the sacrifices which the Soviet Union people endured  
under Stalin be justified by the results achieved in a short period?
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